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Moore’s Law Versus “Man’s” Law?
How Cybersecurity and Cyber Terror 
Government Policies May Help or Hurt 
Entrepreneurial Startups 
David Groshoff*
“Creating malware is bad, but if you sell it to police, it 
becomes okay. . . . We are not lawyers, we are hackers, and we 
know that any kind of rules can, and will, be bypassed. It is our 
job.” 1
—Raphael Vinot 
INTRODUCTION
In 1965, Fairchild Semiconductor’s Gordon Moore (later 
co-founder of Intel Corporation) indicated that “the number of 
transistors capable of being placed on a chip or integrated circuit 
quadruples every three years due to innovations and the march 
of technology.”2 This phenomenon has become known as “Moore’s 
Law,”3 with indications that Moore’s Law has become exponentially 
faster in moving technology forward.4
The Internet as we know it today was essentially invented in 
the 1970s, and the world wide web was invented in the 1990s.5
 * Chair, and Associate Professor of Business, American Jewish University, Los 
Angeles. Ed.M., Harvard University; J.D., The Ohio State University; M.B.A., Northern 
Kentucky University; B.A., Indiana University; former founding General Counsel of 
DreamFund.com, an infrastructure software company founded by the 2007 National 
Entrepreneur of the Year and three-time Inc. 500 CEO Kent Plunkett. I thank Kent 
Plunkett, Yong Zhang, Peter Crosby, and Mi Tang for their assistance in understanding 
cybersecurity from the entrepreneur’s perspective. The Article is meant to be gender-neutral, 
and the non-gender-neutral language in the Article’s title was employed for alliteration. 
1 Raphael Vinot, On Ethics in Information Technology, BOINGBOING (June 13, 2015, 
5:00 AM), http://boingboing.net/2015/06/13/on-ethics-in-information-techn.html [http://per 
ma.cc/ZD7G-WSP2]. 
2 Peter Harsha, IT Research and Development Funding, in CHASING MOORE’S LAW,
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 1, 23 (William Aspray ed., 
2004); see also Steve Mosier, Telecommunications and Computers: A Tale of Convergence, 
in CHASING MOORE’S LAW, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES,
supra, at 29, 37. 
3 Mosier, supra note 2, at 37. 
4 See Harsha, supra note 2, at 23; Mosier, supra note 2, at 37. 
5 See Mosier, supra note 2, at 35–36. 
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Moore’s Law likely applies to the Internet6 and web as well, for 
good and bad, with the bad meaning that laws, rules, regulations, 
and policy levers cannot keep up with a rapidly moving, 
technology-driven economy, which has led to very recent and 
well-publicized cybersecurity breaches that this Symposium and 
this Article research and discuss. 
Perhaps the most widely known cyberattack in the paradigm 
existing during the past several years occurred at the former 
Dayton-Hudson Corporation, now known as Target Corporation.7
In this cyber breach, called a “watershed moment” in Target’s 
hometown newspaper by at least one expert,8 the hackers 
captured customer data from payment cards via malware that 
had unknowingly been installed in Target’s computer system 
through a Target vendor. While the cybersecurity breach against 
Target occurred in 2013, affected approximately 110 million 
Target customers, and was the end-result of a so-called 
“phishing scam” from a vendor,9 the case has already 
6 In 1995, the Federal Network Council officially defined the Internet as: 
the global communication system that—(i) is logically linked together by a 
globally unique address space based on the Internet Protocol (IP) or its 
subsequent extensions/follow-ons; (ii) is able to support communications using 
the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) suite or its 
subsequent extensions/follow-ons, and/or other IP-compatible protocols; and 
(iii) provides, uses or makes accessible, either publicly or privately, high level 
services layered on the communications and related infrastructure described 
herein.
Id. at 36 (citing Definition of “Internet,” NETWORKING & INFO. TECH. RES. & DEV. (NITRD)
PROGRAM (Oct. 24, 1995), http://www.itrd.gov/fnc/Internet_res.html [http://perma.cc/6L45-
Z9ET]).
7 See, e.g., Inside Target Corp., Days after 2013 Breach, KREBS ON SECURITY
(Sept. 21, 2015, 12:01 AM), http://krebsonsecurity.com/2015/09/inside-target-corp-days-
after-2013-breach/ [http://perma.cc/M7DD-SAS8] (indicating that Target has since hired 
outside consultants). Target also has created a so-called “cyber-fusion center” to improve 
security and sponsored a national cybersecurity forum. See Inside Target’s Cyber Fusion 
Center, A BULLSEYE VIEW (July 21, 2015), https://corporate.target.com/article/2015/07/ 
cyber-fusion-center [http://perma.cc/5AUT-7XCL] (indicating that Target Corp. planned to 
invest over $1 billion in cybersecurity in 2015). 
8 Tom Web, Cyber–Security Expert: Target Case is ‘Watershed Moment,’
TWINCITIES.COM (Feb. 2, 2014, 12:01 AM), http://www.twincities.com/ci_25047596/cyber-
security-expert-target-case-is-watershed-moment [http://perma.cc/DB4W-8YZQ]. 
9 Dan Goodin, Epic Target Hack Reportedly Began with Malware-Based Phishing 
E-mail: Attack Hit Contractor Two Months Before the Compromise of 40 Million Payment 
Cards, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 12, 2014, 1:00 PM), http://arstechnica.com/security/2014/02/ 
epictarget-hack-reportedly-began-with-malware-based-phishing-e-mail/ [http://perma.cc/7H35-
A7DQ]. Initially,  
‘phishing’ campaigns typically involved an e-mail that appeared to be coming 
from [an entity] convincing users they needed to change their passwords or 
provide some piece of information . . . . A fake web page and users’ willingness 
to fix the nonexistent problem led to account takeovers and fraudulent 
transactions.
   Phishing campaigns have evolved in recent years to incorporation 
installation of malware as the second stage of the attack. 
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been included in business school and management program 
books.10
This cyber breach could cost Target several billion dollars, 
and that is before private litigation costs.11 Target did maintain a 
cybersecurity insurance policy that covered approximately $90 
million, according to an S&P estimate in June 2015.12 Further, 
the cyber breach caused Target executives to testify before 
Congress and forced the company to face federal and state 
investigations relative to how the cybersecurity breach occurred. 
In response to a Secret Service official’s statement that what 
occurred to Target was “highly technical and sophisticated,” 
Target’s CEO, Greg Steinhafel, asserted that the statement 
“show[ed] [that] it’s not just our operation. It would be hard for 
any retailer to withstand this.”13
Despite government calls against Target in early 2014, later 
that year, the federal government itself announced that its Office 
of Personnel Management was hacked, potentially compromising 
the personal data of approximately 4 to 20 million existing and 
former federal employees.14 U.S. officials blamed this breach on 
hackers from China, possibly constituting cyberespionage, as 
“Chinese state-sponsored hackers are the leading suspects,” who 
relied on a method of attack known as spear phishing.15
VERIZON, 2015 DATA BREACH INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 12 (2015), http://www.verizon 
enterprise.com/DBIR/2015/. In 2013, more than two-thirds of cyber-espionage 
compromising incidents involved phishing. Id. Approximately five malware events occur 
every second, which is after controls including intrusion prevention systems (“IPS”), 
intrusion detection systems (“IDS”), firewalls, and spam filters have done their work. Id.
at 21.
10 See, e.g., ANGELO KINICKI & BRIAN K. WILLIAMS, MANAGEMENT: A PRACTICAL
INTRODUCTION 37–38 (7th ed. 2016). 
11 See, e.g., Ashlee Kieler, Target to Face Class-Action Lawsuit from Banks over Data 
Breach, CONSUMERIST (Sept. 16, 2015), http://consumerist.com/2015/09/16/target-to-face-
class-action-lawsuit-from-banks-over-data-breach/ [http://perma.cc/GCU3-RJD8].  
12 See Sonali Basak, Worried About a Cyber-Apocalypse? AIG Wants to Sell You a 
Policy, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (July 22, 2015, 2:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/articles/2015-07-22/worried-about-a-cyber-apocalypse-aig-wants-to-sell-you-a-policy 
[http://perma.cc/D2DG-RZR6]. 
13 Monica Langley, Inside Target, CEO Gregg Steinhafel Struggles to Contain Giant 
Cybertheft, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 18, 2014, 10:48 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142 
4052702304703804579382941509180758.
14 See, e.g., Ellen Nakashima, Chinese Breach Data of 4 Million Federal Workers,
WASH. POST (June 4, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/ 
chinese-hackers-breach-federal-governments-personnel-office/2015/06/04/889c0e52-0af7-1 
1e5-95fd-d580f1c5d44e_story.html [http://perma.cc/LUN2-TXBP]; cf. infra note 44 (referring 
to a twenty-million number). 
15 Josh Chin, Cyber Sleuths Track Hacker to China’s Military, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 23, 
2015, 5:00 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/cyber-sleuths-track-hacker-to-chinas-military-
1443042030. This assertion is not to suggest that the United States does not engage in 
cyber surveillance internally or externally. See Charlie Savage et al., Hunting for 
Hackers, N.S.A. Secretly Expands Internet Spying at Border, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/05/us/hunting-for-hackers-nsa-secretly-expands-internet- 
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Very personal websites such as Ashley Madison—the 
purpose of which was to assist adults in finding a partner with 
whom to commit adultery—were hacked in 2015. This led to the 
disclosure of details from 32 million accounts and the loss of 
human capital, in addition to financial capital, as some customers 
of that website committed suicide as a result of the data breach 
of which Ashley Madison had been forewarned.16 The Internal 
Revenue Service (“IRS”) admitted breaches to its system, leading 
to the disruption of information of approximately 300,000 people. 
Simply put, cybersecurity is not a public sector issue or a 
private sector issue. The federal government should not be 
putting businesses such as Target through costly investigations 
while at the same time leaving the nation’s power grid vulnerable, 
and exposing millions of people’s personal information—stored by 
state-sponsored government entities such as UCLA’s medical 
system and the IRS—to data breaches.17 Even software 
technology companies have been hacked in the past year, as 
Apple, Inc. became victim in mid-September 2015.18 To attempt 
to combat the various forms of cyber-rattling that have been 
occurring, a number of discussions have taken place offering a 
variety of proposals, including this Symposium. 
However, one hugely important sector of the U.S. economy 
that appears to be ignored in all of this discussion is the plight of 
risk management relative to cybersecurity for the entrepreneur. 
For purposes of this Article, “entrepreneur” means a startup 
enterprise or the founder of a startup entity for which the 
end-goal is that the entity scale to the point of an initial public 
offering (“IPO”) under U.S. securities regulations or an 
acquisition of the business. This Article considers the risks and 
costs and policy arguments relative to attempting to run 
a  lean—non-cybersecurity—startup, while simultaneously 
attempting to disrupt industries and compete with existing rivals 
in the public, private, and government sectors that have proven 
spying-at-us-border.html [http://perma.cc/4LQC-FZNL]. 
16 See, e.g., Laurie Segall, Pastor Outed on Ashley Madison Commits Suicide, CNN
MONEY (Sept. 8, 2015, 7:10 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/09/08/technology/ashley-
madison-suicide/index.html [http://perma.cc/CVC4-5QAA]; see also Chris Isidore & David 
Goldman, Ashley Madison Hackers Post Millions of Customer Names, CNN MONEY (Aug. 
18, 2015, 12:39 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/08/18/technology/ashley-madison-data-
dump/index.html?iid=EL [http://perma.cc/2ZCZ-VAYM] (stating that a month prior to the 
data release, the hackers, calling themselves the “Impact Team,” indicated they would 
hack and release the information obtained unless the website ceased operations). 
17 IRS Breach Bigger than Thought, CNBC (Aug. 17, 2015, 2:07 PM), http://video. 
cnbc.com/gallery/?video=3000407838. 
18  Yang Jie & Josh Chin, Apple iOS Breach No Mere ‘Mistaken Experiment,’ Chinese 
Experts Say, WALL ST. J.: CHINA REAL TIME (Sept. 21, 2015, 8:55 PM), http://blogs.wsj.
com/chinarealtime/2015/09/21/prank-or-hack-apple-china-breach-in-eye-of-beholder/. 
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incapable of protecting themselves or their respective customer 
bases, despite employing costly protective measures. 
The Article first briefly provides an historical framework—
including contextualizing recent events—regarding cybersecurity. 
Next, the Article discusses what options are available to 
businesses, due to the many recent breaches and failures of 
government to defend against cyber hacking and cyber terror, 
and then bifurcates the options available to established 
businesses and startup entrepreneurial businesses. Third, the 
Article discusses existing material cyberlaws, regulations, and 
executive orders, as well as laws proposed by President Obama in 
early 2015. Fourth, the Article uses those existing and proposed 
rules to examine the pros and cons of applying a public-private 
partnership to combat cyberthreats versus employing a purely 
market-based solution.  
Finally, the Article argues, and underpins with policy 
proscriptions, that due to the huge differences between 
established businesses and entrepreneurial startups, their legal 
responsibilities should be placed under the rubric of a sliding 
scale of fiduciary duties of care relative to personally identifiable 
information (“PII”) and cyberattack mitigation, based on a 
business’s size, scale, and duration since formation. This Part 
also proposes that each state mandate corporations, limited 
liability companies, and other owner liability-shielded entities 
require a risk management committee of its board of directors or 
governing body. The Article concludes that, due to the many 
moving parts that exist in this area, the private sector should 
lead the way in cyber protection, including self-policing and 
certifying. Solely foreign governmental attacks on domestic U.S. 
private or governmental cyber-hacking entities require a federal 
mandate on businesses, rather than cyber hackers, that impact 
U.S. citizens, businesses, and financial capital. 
I. BACKGROUND ON CYBERSECURITY AND CYBER LAW
A. Lack of Meaningful Historical Guidance 
Given that the majority of examples of cyber-hacking 
described in this Article’s introduction occurred after the 
Chapman Law Review’s announcement of this Symposium, one 
can reasonably understand how quickly the field of cybersecurity 
is moving relative to other areas of law and policy. For example, 
the initial federal statute concerning computer crimes occurred 
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in 1984.19 Less than three years old, 2013’s Internet and Online 
Law,20 a practice guide, already seems dated relative to its 
awareness or discussion of the existing and looming 
cybersecurity threat. Although that text contains a robust section 
entitled “Privacy, Data Protection and Related Issues,”21 none of 
the numerous statutes, regulations, rules, and common laws 
mentioned in the text are able to prevent any material 
cybersecurity matters or materially affect a business’ 
cybersecurity attempts.  
Another text, Technology Innovation Law and Practice Cases 
and Materials,22 while again providing robust discussion on other 
areas of law and technology, is essentially silent on cybersecurity 
and cybercrime.23 Subsequent cases have been largely ineffective 
to prevent or deter cybercrime.24 Worse, during several cybercrimes 
19 Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–473, § 2102(a), 98 Stat. 1837, 2190 (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. 1030 (2012)); see also United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504, 507 
(2d Cir. 1991). 
20 KENT D. STUCKEY, INTERNET AND ONLINE LAW (2013); cf. CLIFFORD ENNICO,
ADVISING EBUSINESSES §§ 11:1–11:15 (2011–2012 ed.) (stating essentially same).
21 See STUCKEY, supra note 20, §§ 5.01–5.03 (describing the many acts affecting 
privacy rights online including: (a) the Mail Privacy Statute; (b) Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act and Stored Communications Act; (c) the Communications 
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Computer Fraud and Abuse Act; (d) Federal Trade 
Commission Act; (e) Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (“COPPA”); (f) USA Patriot 
Act; (g) Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPPA”); 
(h) Graham-Leach-Bliley Act; (i) Common Law Invasion of Privacy Torts; (j) Fair Credit 
Reporting Act; (k) Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act; (k) State Laws and 
Requirements Imposed on States by the Federal Government; (l) the Stored 
Communications Provisions of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act; and 
(m) general descriptions of consumer privacy, identity theft, and the “tension” between 
public and “hyper-public” information). 
22 THEODORE M. HAGELIN, TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION LAW AND PRACTICE CASES AND 
MATERIALS (2011). 
23 See id.
24 See, e.g., United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 859–60 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(interpreting the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030, and stating that 
“[b]asing criminal liability on violations of private computer use policies can transform 
whole categories of otherwise innocuous behavior into federal crimes simply because a 
computer is involved”). But cf. United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 270–73 (5th Cir. 2010) 
(stating that employees may exceed permissible use of employer data of customer 
information); United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1263–64 (11th Cir. 2010) 
(holding that a government employee of the Social Security Administration exceeded 
permissible access under the law when obtaining personally identifiable information 
regarding romantic and former romantic interests of the government employee); People 
v. Harris, 945 N.Y.S.2d 505, 511–13 (Crim. Ct. 2012) (using the Stored Communications 
Act to quash a subpoena to obtain information regarding a Twitter account and worrying 
that an overbroad interpretation of the Stored Communications Act would lead to 
“litigation by hypothetical,” which “becomes particularly risky in the face of ever-evolving 
and ever-more-complicated technology”). Regardless, the penalties against the wrongdoers 
under this regulatory scheme do little to protect personally identifiable information, 
consumers, and customers in any material way, and as this Article’s introduction 
suggested, these cases, even when a violation may exist, appear to do little to dissuade 
large-scale cybercrime. 
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or related criminal cases, jurors have inappropriately used social 
media in contravention of court orders or rules.25
Further, according to Verizon’s 2015 Data Breach 
Investigations Report, the New York Times employed the term 
“data breach” in 700 articles in the year 2014, up from fewer than 
125 articles just one year earlier.26 Additionally, Verizon reported 
that 2014 became the year that the data breach was of the 
“cyber” variety.27 Moreover, these articles described nearly 
80,000 cybersecurity incidents, with more than 2000 confirmed 
breaches, affecting 700 million compromised records and costing 
$400 million in financial losses in 2014.28 While the top three 
affected industries in 2014 were the same as in previous years of 
Verizon’s studies since 2008—Public, Information, and Financial 
Services—Section C of this Part describes a broader set of 
industries that have become increasingly relevant during 2015,29
because of (1) Moore’s Law, (2) Verizon’s conclusion that mobile 
app problems were not a problem as of year-end 2014,30 and 
(3) although “anything that leads to the discovery of an incident 
is worthwhile . . . in most cases, context is key.”31
B. Paucity of Case Law and Academic Writing on the Matter 
In conducting initial research for this Article in the late 
Spring of 2015, I conducted a Lexis database search using the term 
“cybersecurity” and located only ninety-five cases—underscoring 
the current importance of the case law cited earlier32—and fewer 
than two dozen relevant law journal articles.33 I believe it is safe 
for me to assert at this time that technology and human action in 
this arena are well ahead of meaningful protective legal and 
policy instruments. For a current example—albeit in a slightly 
different arena of business disruption—that illustrates technology 
outpacing the extant legal regime, one need simply review Uber’s 
and Lyft’s business models versus traditional taxi cabs.34
25 See, e.g., United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 298 (3d Cir. 2011); Commonwealth 
v. Werner, 967 N.E.2d 159, 167–69 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012). 
26 VERIZON, supra note 9, at 1. 
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 3. 
30 Id. at 18–19 (stating that FireEye, Inc.—discussed infra note 89 and accompanying 
text—indicated that under 0.03% of smartphones per week had malicious code infections 
based on 1400 EnPublic Apps, and Kindsight Security Labs’ biannual report indicated a rate 
of 0.68%); see also Motive Security Labs Malware Reports, ALCATEL LUCENT, www.alcatel-
lucent.com/solutions/malware-reports [http://perma.cc/7B5M-NDFP].  
31 VERIZON, supra note 9, at 11. 
32 See supra notes 19, 24–25 and accompanying text. 
33 Screen capture on file with author. 
34 See, e.g., Andrei Hagiu, Work 3.0: Redefining Jobs and Companies in the Uber Age,
HARV. BUS. SCH. (Sept. 29, 2015), http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/work-3-0-redefining-jobs-and-
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C. Industry Examples of Real Consequences Beyond the 
Consumer Phase 
1. Recent Concurring Black Swan Events Across Industries 
During 2015, society witnessed black swan cybersecurity 
events, such as simultaneous cyber outages to major components 
of U.S. industry. For example, first, on July 8, 2015, at 
approximately 10:00 a.m., one of the nation’s largest airlines, 
UAL/Continental grounded its flights due to cyber problems, with 
the company’s former CEO describing UAL as “100% dependent 
on IT.”35 Second, at approximately 11:32 a.m. on the same day, 
the New York Stock Exchange’s (“NYSE’s”) computer 
infrastructure failed, leading to the longest suspension of trading 
(and the cancelling of all prior trades) since at least the so-called 
“flash-crash” of 2009.36 Third, during this time on the same day, 
the financial media websites of the Wall Street Journal and
ZeroHedge also failed.37
The confluence of these events led not only to spikes in the 
share prices of cybersecurity firms once share trading resumed,38
but also to two Justice Department officials commenting on the 
matter, President Obama being briefed on the issue and 
subsequently issuing a statement, the involvement of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), and a statement from the 
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”).39 Eerily, on the eve 
companies-in-the-uber-age [http://perma.cc/3YMX-5DHU].  
35 UAL 100% Dependent on IT: Former Continental CEO, CNBC (July 8, 2015, 10:11 
AM), http://video.cnbc.com/gallery/?video=3000395071; United Flights Grounded Due to 
Computer Issue, CNBC (July 8, 2015, 9:51 AM), http://video.cnbc.com/gallery/?video=3000 
395056.
36 UAL 100% Dependent on IT: Former Continental CEO, supra note 35; United 
Flights Grounded Due to Computer Issue, supra note 35. 
37 See, e.g., Tyler Durden, And Now the Wall Street Journal Is Down, ZEROHEDGE
(July 8, 2015, 11:50 AM), http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-07-08/wall-street-journal-
down [http://perma.cc/3RU3-6XJB]; see also Kaja Whitehouse, WSJ, Barrons 
Hacked: CEO Warns of Wider Plot, USA TODAY (Oct. 9, 2015, 5:06 PM), http://www.usa 
today.com/story/money/2015/10/09/barrons-hacked-ceo-warns-wider-plot/73663568/
[http://perma.cc/3KJB-REWG] (indicating that the Wall Street Journal announced in 
October 2015 that the business has been hacked multiple times since at least 2012). 
38 See, e.g., FactorShares Trust PureFunds ISE Cyber Security ETF, MARKETWATCH
(July 8, 2015), http://www.marketwatch.com/investing/fund/HACK/historical?siteid=mktw 
&date=July%208%2C%202015&userName=&password=&remChk=on&returnUrl=&persi
st=&x=15&y=12 [http://perma.cc/K4JM-VV46] (rising more than 1.7% for a basket of 
cybersecurity stocks on more than double the average daily trading volume for the stock); 
see also CyberArk Software Ltd., MARKETWATCH (July 8, 2015), http://www.market 
watch.com/investing/stock/CYBR/historical?siteid=mktw&date=July%208%2C%202015&
userName=&password=&remChk=on&returnUrl=&persist=&x=0&y=0 [http://perma.cc/7 
ASB-HKUT] (rising more than 8.8% in intra-day trading for cybersecurity firm CyberArk 
discussed infra).
39 See, e.g., FBI: Monitoring Situation at NYSE, CNBC (July 8, 2015, 12:39 PM), 
http://video.cnbc.com/gallery/?video=3000395115; Homeland Security: No Nefarious Actor 
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of this non-harmonic convergence, a mysterious tweet predicted 
the occurrence of the highly improbable event of the NYSE’s 
shutdown.40
However, a meaningful question remains as to how much of 
a black swan event this instance in July 2015 was.41 Only a 
month earlier, in June 2015, former FBI agent Austin Berglas— 
who in 2009 created the New York branch of the FBI’s 
cybercrime unit—described a hypothetical scenario in which the 
NASDAQ market, the New York subway system, and Con Edison 
(New York City’s largest gas and electric company) all 
simultaneously went offline.42 Con Edison is part of the 
public-private U.S. power grid, which, according to representatives 
of the federal government, contains vulnerabilities that could 
cost approximately $1 trillion to secure.43
2. Public Sector: U.S. Government, Cybersecurity, and 
Cyberterrorism
Moving from the private to the public sector, as discussed 
earlier in this Article, the U.S. government was subjected to a 
material cybersecurity breach in late 2014. The size and scope of 
this breach are still unknown, but it is believed to have affected 
approximately 20 million people in the United States,44 and the 
in United and NYSE Issues, CNBC (July 8, 2015, 1:25 PM), http://video.cnbc.com/ 
gallery/?video=3000395165; No Indications United and NYSE Glitches Related, CNBC
(July 8, 2015, 12:02 PM), http://video.cnbc.com/gallery/?video=3000395110; White House: 
President Briefed on NYSE Halt, CNBC (July 8, 2015, 1:36 PM), http://video.cnbc.com/ 
gallery/?video=3000395167.
40 See, e.g., Jesse Byrnes, Anonymous Issued Cryptic Tweet on Eve of NYSE 
Suspension, HILL (July 8, 2015, 1:55 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/247225-
anonymous-issued-cryptic-tweet-on-eve-of-nyse-suspension [http://perma.cc/6XXR-V4NJ]. 
For more information regarding the group known as “Anonymous,” see infra note 70.
41 See, e.g., Edward Helmore, The New Sage of Wall Street, GUARDIAN (Sept. 27, 
2008, 7:01 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/books/2008/sep/28/businessandfinance.philo
sophy [http://perma.cc/4AMW-EHC5] (“[‘Black swan event’] refers to the medieval belief 
that all swans were white, hence black swan was a metaphor for something that could not 
exist, a metaphor that shifted into a perceived impossibility that came to pass when black 
swans were discovered in the 17th century.”). See generally NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE
BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY IMPROBABLE (2010); Bill Conerly, Uncertainty
and Risk Management: What to Do About Black Swans?, FORBES (Feb. 20, 2013, 5:34 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/billconerly/2013/02/20/uncertainty-and-risk-management-what- 
to-do-about-black-swans/.
42 Basak, supra note12.
43 See Protecting US Power Grid from Hack Attack, CNBC (June 30, 2015, 8:43 AM), 
http://video.cnbc.com/gallery/?video=3000392902 (showing Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, 
Deputy Secretary of Energy, discussing federal attempts to protect the nation’s power 
from cybersecurity threats); see also Ben DiPietro, Attack on U.S. Electrical Grid Could 
Cost $1 Trillion, WALL ST. J. (July 8, 2015, 10:44 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/ 
2015/07/08/attack-on-u-s-electrical-grid-could-cost-1-trillion/.
44 See, e.g., Matt Spetalnick & Michael Martina, Obama Announces ‘Understanding’ 
with China’s Xi on Cyber Theft but Remains Wary, REUTERS (Sept. 26, 2015, 8:19 AM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/26/us-usa-china-idUSKCN0RO2HQ20150926
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IRS cybersecurity breach is apparently larger than first 
thought,45 including the government workers mentioned earlier 
in this Article. Further, when Chinese President Xi Jinping 
visited the United States in September 2015, cybersecurity 
threats—arguably cyberterrorism—became a meaningful topic of 
discussion between Jinping and President Barack Obama.46
3. Technology Sector: Apps and Snapchat 
Even the software industry can get hacked. In September 
2015, Apple’s iOS app store was hacked by malware.47 A code 
named XCodeGhost—rather than the intended-to-be-used-code 
called XCode—fooled app developers into injecting 
malware-infected code into the apps they were creating.48 This 
malware could steal users’ logins or send false prompts. Apple 
did not indicate how many apps or users were affected by that 
cyber breach.49 Many of the infected apps were located in the 
China app store.50
Through 2014, Symantec has identified more than 1 million 
apps “that are classified as malware,”51 including 
crypto-ransomware.52
Another technology company to suffer a cyberhack includes 
the popular picture posting platform, Snapchat.53
[http://perma.cc/K2SK-KF5S] (suggesting that government-to-government cyberspying 
“could include the massive hack of the federal government’s personnel office this year that 
compromised the data of more than 20 million people”); see also Jackie Northam, Obama
Meets with China’s President Amid ‘Enormous Strain’ Between Nations, NPR (Sept. 24,
2015, 7:35 AM) http://www.npr.org/2015/09/24/443053658/obama-meets-with-chinas-
president-amid-enormous-strain-between-nations [http://perma.cc/5KL2-NWLL] (“[T]his 
two-day visit by President Xi Jinping comes during a particularly turbulent time in 
U.S.-China relations.”). 
45 See, e.g., IRS Breach Bigger than Thought, CNBC (Aug. 17, 2015, 2:07 PM),
http://video.cnbc.com/gallery/?video=3000407838 (estimating over 330,000 taxpayers 
having their PII breached from the IRS). 
46 See, e.g., Spetalnick & Martina, supra note 44 (indicating, inter alia, the discussion 
occurred amid “growing U.S. complaints about Chinese hacking of government and corporate 
databases, and the suspicion in Washington that Beijing is sometimes behind it”).  
47 Josh Chin, Malware Creeps into Apple Apps, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 2015, at B1. 
48 Hack Attack on Apple’s iOS App Store, CNBC (Sept. 21, 2015, 9:00 AM), 
http://video.cnbc.com/gallery/?video=3000422910.
49 Id.
50 Id. But see generally Anti-theft Protection for iOS (Apple) Wireless Handsets, CTIA, 
http://www.ctia.org/your-wireless-life/consumer-tips/how-to-deter-smartphone-thefts-and-
protect-your-data/anti-theft-protection-for-ios-apple-wireless-handsets [http://perma.cc/6H 
MT-A5KU] (last updated June 2015) (representing, respectively, app and cyber protection 
apps for mobile devices); KNOW MY APP, http://www.knowmyapp.org/ [http://perma.cc/ 
8H3C-7GHH].
51 SYMANTEC, INTERNET SECURITY THREAT REPORT 19 (Apr. 2015) https://www4. 
symantec.com/mktginfo/whitepaper/ISTR/21347932_GA-internet-security-threat-report-
volume-20-2015-social_v2.pdf [http://perma.cc/6EXV-KEQE]. 
52 Id. at 25. 
53 See, e.g., Byron Tau & Elizabeth Dwoskin, White House Proposes Consumer 
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4. Non-profit and Medical Sector: UCLA Health 
UCLA Health, a well-known health services provider that 
has a number of famous celebrities among its client base due to 
its geographic location, was breached in the summer of 2015, 
impacting the PII and medical records of approximately 4.5 
million patients.54 Reviewing cybersecurity in the medical sector, 
from a legal perspective, some cyber-risk management firms, 
such as Kroll, described later in Part II, have been able to work 
with legal counsel to demonstrate to government attorneys that 
the manner in which data had been saved by the hospital was 
equivalent to encryption, so the state’s attorney general 
recognized the matter as an exception to state law.55
Despite being highly regulated by government administrative 
agencies, data breaches in the healthcare industry often involve 
matters of life and death. For example, Gartner, Inc., a 
technology-research company whose ticker symbol on the NYSE 
is “IT” (i.e., “information technology”), indicated at the 2015 
ITxpo that the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) recently 
recommended the removal from commerce of an insulin pump 
due to the potential of the pump being hackable in hospital 
networks.56 Symantec indicated that in addition to insulin 
pumps, pacemakers also are at risk.57
5. The Connected Car: Automobile Sector Cyber Hacking 
Cybersecurity issues in the automotive industry can also 
involve life-and-death situations.58 In July 2015, “two veteran 
cybersecurity researchers . . . used a software vulnerability . . . to 
break into a Jeep Cherokee being driven on the highway, 
intensifying the debate about the safety of increasingly connected 
cars and trucks.”59 The Jeep cyberhack affected air conditioning, 
Cybersecurity Measures, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 12, 2015, 2:08 PM), http://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/white-house-to-propose-consumer-cybersecurity-measures-1421068868.
54 See, e.g., Chad Terhune, UCLA Health System Data Breach Affects 4.5 Million 
Patients, L.A. TIMES (July 17, 2015, 5:51 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-ucla-
medical-data-20150717-story.html [http://perma.cc/RX69-XTVS]. For information regarding 
the predictable class action lawsuit that followed, see Ortiz v. UCLA Health System, 
No. BC589327 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cty. July 29, 2015). 
55 Risk Analysis – University Medical Center, KROLL, http://www.kroll.com/en-us/ 
intelligence-center/case-studies/cyber-security/risk-analysis-university-medical-center 
[http://perma.cc/23DC-BT57].  
56 Tom Loftus, Cybersecurity Becomes Life or Death Issue as Companies Add Tech to 
Consumer Devices, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 6, 2015, 8:08 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2015/10/06/ 
cybersecurity-becomes-life-or-death-issue-as-companies-add-tech-to-consumer-devices/.  
57 SYMANTEC, supra note 51, at 29. 
58 I acknowledge that this Section’s title could have referred to the “Internet of 
Things,” rather than the automobile industry. The “Internet of Things” refers to 
“embedded computing devices with Internet connectivity.” Id. at 26. 
59 Abhirup Roy, Harman Says Car Hacking Risk Restricted to Fiat Chrysler,
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windshield wipers, and “cut the transmission,” leading the car’s 
accelerator to immediately stop functioning.60
And in August 2015, researchers at the University of California, 
San Diego indicated that they successfully cyberhacked a 2013 
Chevrolet Corvette.61 This breach apparently permitted the 
researchers to send messages to the vehicle that not only 
operated windshield wipers but also tampered with brakes while 
the vehicle was driving.62 As a result, these cyberhacks in the 
auto space evidence that the accelerators and brakes, among 
other devices, in automobiles are vulnerable to cybercrime that 
could have fatal consequences. A recent article posed the 
question regarding cybersecurity and connected cars, inquiring 
whether an industry-generated solution “without any 
[g]overnmental approval is the right strategy.”63
6. Policy Tensions: Privacy Concerns Versus Cyberterrorism 
Protection Efforts 
Further questioning government-involved solutions is the 
testimony in June 2015 of a FBI official before Congress 
indicating that the FBI faced a challenge to “[work] with tech 
companies ‘to build technological solutions to prevent encryption 
above all else.’”64 Simply put, this means that the FBI wanted the 
government to “make tech companies build in ways for law 
enforcement to access secured content from their products.”65 The 
FBI official, Michael B. Steinbach, assistant director of the FBI’s 
Counterterrorism Division, also oddly disputed the “back door” 
REUTERS (Aug. 4, 2015, 4:32 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-fiat-chrysler-hacking-
harman-intl-ind-idUSKCN0Q91TV20150804 [http://perma.cc/7KAF-5TAF]; see also Andy
Greenberg, Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway—with Me in It, WIRED
(July 21, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/2015/07/hackers-remotely-kill-jeep-highway/
[http://perma.cc/ZA3D-ZEB3] (recounting the experience of being in a moving car that 
gets remotely hacked). 
60 Greenberg, supra note 59. 
61 Andy Greenberg, Hackers Cut a Corvette’s Brakes via a Common Car Gadget,
WIRED (Aug. 11, 2015, 7:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/2015/08/hackers-cut-corvettes-
brakes-via-common-car-gadget/ [http://perma.cc/5WY6-P7LF]; see also Pete Bigelow, 
Chevy Corvette Is Latest Car Breached by Hackers, AUTOBLOG (Aug. 11, 2015, 7:20 PM), 
http://www.autoblog.com/2015/08/11/chevy-corvette-car-hackers/ [http://perma.cc/W43E-
ARPK]; Mrlanrat, Fast and Vulnerable, YOUTUBE (Aug. 11, 2015), https://www.you 
tube.com/watch?v=-CH9BvFlrGs (employing a video demonstrating this type of cyberhack 
of automobiles). 
62 Bigelow, supra note 61. 
63 Giulio Coraggio, Car Makers Join Forces for Connected Car Cyber Security,
TECHNOLOGY’S LEGAL EDGE (Aug. 27, 2015), http://www.technologyslegaledge.com/2015/08/ 
27/car-makers-join-forces-for-connected-car-cyber-security/ [http://perma.cc/A48D-LK58]. 
64 Andrea Peterson, FBI Official: Companies Should Help Us ‘Prevent Encryption 
Above All Else,’ WASH. POST (June 4, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
switch/wp/2015/06/04/fbi-official-companies-should-help-us-prevent-encryption-above-all-
else/ [http://perma.cc/5SCL-ECR8]. 
65 Id.
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that software engineers and coders use as access points to enter 
otherwise secure software.66
But this FBI proposal arguably weakens cybersecurity67
because, for example, hackers could use the same back door as 
the government, and the proposal conflicts with some existing 
state law.68 Further, from a policy perspective, the proposal puts 
legitimate privacy rights concerns at loggerheads with the 
legitimate national security concerns described in this Part. 
Moreover, as the CEO of Axeon, Inc., a company offering cyber 
insurance, stated: “[N]o CISO wants to create a vulnerability for 
him or herself by giving out the combination to the back door.”69 
Another problem related to the government potentially acting 
overzealously in its prosecution of cyberhacks is described in the 
next sub-section. 
7. Government and Third-Party Overreaching Responses to a 
Cybersecurity Breach 
The government’s and the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology’s (“MIT’s”) response to—and arguable cause of—the 
suicide of twenty-six-year-old hacker Aaron Swartz, appears 
disappointing.70 Swartz successfully hacked into MIT’s electronic 
JSTOR academic database to make innocuous academic 
information publicly available—actions seemingly fitting within 
MIT’s own stated goals for “open education” and support for 
“hackathons.”71 Yet, despite those goals, Swartz was relentlessly 
pursued by MIT and government authorities, to the tune of 
thirteen felony counts and at least fifty years in prison.72 These 
acts by government attorneys and MIT ostensibly led Swartz to 
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 See, e.g., COMMONWEALTH OF MASS. OFFICE OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS & BUS.
REGULATION, A SMALL BUS. GUIDE: FORMULATING A COMPREHENSIVE WRITTEN INFO. SEC.
PROGRAM, http://www.mass.gov/ocabr/docs/idtheft/sec-plan-smallbiz-guide.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
82KV-LL7E].
69 Christopher P. Skroupa, The Insurance Industry’s Vantage Point on Cyber Security,
FORBES (July 9, 2015, 5:42 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherskroupa/2015/07/
09/the-insurance-industrys-unique-vantage-point-on-cyber-security/#530e2a1a7f9d (CISO 
stands for Chief Information Security Officer). 
70 Sam Gustin, Aaron Swartz’s Suicide Prompts MIT Soul-Searching, TIME (Jan. 14, 
2013), http://business.time.com/2013/01/14/mit-orders-review-of-aaron-swartz-suicide-as-
soul-searching-begins/ [http://perma.cc/NPN9-U9F6]; see also Lawrence Lessig, Why They 
Mattered: Aaron Swartz, POLITICO (Dec. 22, 2013), http://www.politico.com/magazine/ 
story/2013/12/aaron-swartz-obituary-101418 [http://perma.cc/X8NJ-CUTB]. 
71 Hackathon, RECLAIM OPEN LEARNING, http://open.media.mit.edu/hackathon/ 
[http://perma.cc/VV7K-9HEF].  
72 Tim Cushing, US Government Ups Felony Count in JSTOR/Aaron Swartz Case 
from Four to Thirteen, TECHDIRT (Sept. 18, 2012, 7:42 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/ 
articles/20120917/17393320412/us-government-ups-felony-count-jstoraaron-swartz-case-
four-to-thirteen.shtml [http://perma.cc/4NQB-Q4M4]. 
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the point where Swartz believed that he could no longer live his 
life. MIT’s appalling behavior regarding this cybersecurity 
matter is telling, not only because the school prides itself on its 
tradition of hacking and its alleged desire of “open learning,”73
but also because, according to tenured Harvard Law Professor 
and law and technology expert, Lawrence Lessig, a friend of the 
young Swartz, JSTOR declined to pursue any action against 
Swartz and requested that the government drop its case against 
Swartz.74
Swartz’s suicide led to MIT being hacked again by so-called 
“hacktivists” known only as “Anonymous,”75 who are discussed 
later in this Article.76 I hope that Swartz’s hacking legacy 
remains an important part of big data and cybersecurity 
discussions, particularly because he came from a university 
famous for “hacking.” However, none of the charges brought 
against Swartz would have prevented or stopped the events 
described in this Article. Yet, what I am not observing in the 
legal, business, or financial media is a rational discussion of the 
real economic carnage—not the made-up kind that Professor 
Lessig alleged occurred with Swartz77—that can occur from a 
cybersecurity breach. 
8. 401(k)s and Other Defined Contribution Plans, 
Investment, and Savings Accounts 
I accept that, frankly, the loss of some of my customer or 
personally identifiable information in a data breach that occurs 
at a retailer such as Target, is not hugely impactful to me. For 
well over a decade, anyone could go online and purchase my 
73 See generally HackMIT 2015, HACKMIT, https://hackmit.org/ [http://perma.cc/ 
RKW8-655C] (discussing MIT’s largest Hackathon); MIT HACKING MEDICINE,
http://hackingmedicine.mit.edu/ [http://perma.cc/BC6C-X8C2] (stating “[w]hy we should 
all hack medicine”). 
74 See Gustin, supra note 70; Lawrence Lessig, Prosecutor as Bully, LESSIG BLOG V2,
http://lessig.tumblr.com/post/40347463044/prosecutor-as-bully [http://perma.cc/GQ6C-AB 
UT]; Juan Carlos Perez, Hactivist, Internet Innovator Aaron Swartz Commits Suicide,
PCWORLD (Jan. 12, 2013, 4:47 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2025165/hactivist-
internet-innovator-aaron-swartz-commits-suicide.html [http://perma.cc/Z7AP-LJ7T] 
(indicating Professor Lessig’s friendship with Swartz). 
75 For more regarding the group Anonymous and hacking, see Gustin, supra note 70 
and accompanying text. 
76 Anonymous Hactivists Target MIT’s Websites over Aaron Swartz Suicide,
TELEGRAPH (Jan. 14, 2013, 11:45 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/980
0257/Anonymous-hacktivists-target-MIT-websites-over-Aaron-Swartz-suicide.html [http:// 
perma.cc/RNT2-493Q].
77 See Lessig, supra note 74 (“[A]nyone who says that there is money to be made in a 
stash of ACADEMIC ARTICLES is either an idiot or a liar. It was clear what this was 
not, yet our government continued to push as if it had caught the 9/11 terrorists 
red-handed. Aaron had literally done nothing in his life ‘to make money.’”) (emphasis in 
original).
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social security number, residential address, telephone information, 
and the like. I recognize that my financial liability for 
unauthorized charges to my credit cards is fifty dollars. An 
inconvenience, yes, but putting me on the verge of bankruptcy, 
no. But an example of what may put people on the verge of 
bankruptcy—or being forced to eat cat food in retirement—occurred 
in October 2015, as Scottrade, a well-known discount securities 
broker was hacked.78 Seemingly, only a matter of time exists 
before one of the major 401(k) custodians or providers is hacked, 
which could lead to unauthorized trading or funds disappearing 
from accounts.  
Despite 2014 data indicating that the financial services 
sector permitted the least amount of malware events per week 
(an average of 350 per week),79 in 2014, the largest of the “too big 
to fail”80 banks, JPMorganChase & Co.,81 faced a cyber breach 
that impacted over 70 million customers. Even if one believes 
that a life savings stuffed in an account insured by a federal 
agency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), is 
safe, FDIC insurance applies to bank failures, not necessarily 
cyberattacks, unless those attacks ultimately lead to a bank 
failure in which the bank is placed in receivership by the FDIC.82
Therefore, the retirement and financial security of persons in the 
United States is vulnerable to a myriad of unknown 
cyberthreats, with unknown financial consequences, because of 
unknown, unwritten, or outdated policies that are essentially 
impossible to keep up with the rapid pace of technological 
advancement as described by Moore’s Law. Simply because 
trades were reversed on the day of the NYSE’s ostensible 
software failure in July 2015, does not mean that the same result 
would occur following the next cyber terror attack on the NYSE 
or on a different securities market.  
78 Jacob Pramuk, Scottrade Data Breach Affects up to 4M Customers,” CNBC
(Oct. 2, 2015, 2:57 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/10/02/Scottrade-data-breach-affects-
up-to-4m-customers.html [http://perma.cc/PR38-QKX3]. 
79 VERIZON, supra note 9, at 21. 
80 See David C. Wheelock, Too Big to Fail: The Pros and Cons of Breaking up Big 
Banks, REGIONAL ECONOMIST 10 (Oct. 2012), https://www.stlouisfed.org/~/media/Files/
PDFs/publications/pub_assets/pdf/re/2012/d/Too_Big_To_Fail.pdf [http://perma.cc/RD95-
XN3F] (indicating that JPMorgan Chase was the largest of the big banks); see also Halah 
Touryalai, The World’s 29 Too Big to Fail Banks, JPMorgan at the Top, FORBES (Nov. 11, 
2013, 4:27 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/halahtouryalai/2013/11/11/the-worlds-29-too-
big-to-fail-banks-jpmorgan-at-the-top/. 
81 For the purposes of full disclosure and disclosing any potential conflicts of 
interest, I was a JPMorganChase & Co. officer for more than a decade, and the entity is 
an unsecured creditor of mine on a currently undrawn account. 
82 See, e.g., FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., YOUR INSURED DEPOSITS (2014), 
https://www.fdic.gov/deposit/deposits/brochures/Your%20Insured%20Deposits%20-%20 
English.pdf [http://perma.cc/AFG3-SJ2W]; see also Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950, 
Pub. L. No. 81-797, 64 Stat. 873 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (2012)). 
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II. WHAT DO THE ESTABLISHED PRIVATE SECTOR AND 
GOVERNMENTAL FAILURES TO ADEQUATELY DEFEND AGAINST 
CYBERCRIME AT THIS NASCENT STAGE MEAN FOR THE 
ENTREPRENEUR?
This Article has so far demonstrated that, to date, the public 
and private sectors have not thwarted material cyberattacks 
against the United States and its established businesses. Yet, 
e-commerce sales represented more than $3 trillion in 2013,83
and according to consulting firm McKinsey, from 2004–2009, 
electronic transactions represented 15% of U.S. gross domestic 
product (“GDP”) growth.84 To understand what cybersecurity 
means for the entrepreneurial startup enterprise, however, one 
must first understand the milieu in which larger, traditional, or 
established businesses operate in their attempts to manage the 
risk of cyberattacks. This Part begins by looking at data points of 
what those established business do in hopes of preventing a 
cyberattack, then moves to a discussion of several potential 
solutions available to those businesses, and finally concludes 
with identifying the issue unique to entrepreneurs that is not 
practically available to startup enterprises in terms of risk 
management, leaving a meaningful dilemma in an age when 
small entrepreneurial enterprises often work to create many 
mobile apps and Internet platforms.  
A.  How Larger and Established Businesses Manage Cyber Risk 
Although established, large businesses have a plethora of 
cybersecurity firms from whom the established businesses may 
purchase defenses against cyberattacks or cyberterrorism,85
these businesses were the target of approximately 41% of 
spear-phishing attacks.86 These options include offerings from 
newer companies such as CyberArk,87 Palo Alto Networks,88
83 E-stats 2013: Measuring the Electronic Economy, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (May 28, 
2015), http://www.census.gov/econ/estats/e13-estats.pdf [http://perma.cc/XFP5-QN7H].
84 MCKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE, MCKINSEY & CO., INTERNET MATTERS: THE NET’S
SWEEPING IMPACT ON GROWTH, JOBS, AND PROSPERITY 16 (May 2011), 
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/high_tech_telecoms_internet/internet_matters. 
85 Any meaningful discussion of natural person cyber protection generally resides 
beyond this Article’s scope. 
86 SYMANTEC, supra note 51, at 14. 
87 See Renaissance Capital, US IPO Pricing Recap: CyberArk Software Pops 85% and 
Year’s Second Largest IPO Trades up, NASDAQ (Sept. 28, 2014, 1:21 PM), 
http://www.nasdaq.com/article/us-ipo-pricing-recap-cyberark-software-pops-85-and-years-
second-largest-ipo-trades-up-cm396042 [http://perma.cc/C6SD-GDLK]. Israel’s CyberArk, 
although a foreign company, had its initial public offering (“IPO”) on the United States’ 
NASDAQ as recently as 2013, and saw its share price more than triple from June 2014 to 
June 2015. CyberArk—as a foreign cybersecurity company—does, however, raise the 
issue of allowing foreign corporations to collaborate with the U.S. government on 
cyberterrorism and cybersecurity and to what extent these collaborative efforts should go, 
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FireEye,89 Rapid 7,90 or established companies such as IBM91 and 
Cisco.92 Further, beyond cyber prevention and cyber clean-up 
companies, established businesses generally have the ability to 
obtain cybersecurity insurance.93 Arca, a prominent exchange 
traded fund which holds stock of cybersecurity firms and trades 
under the ticker symbol “HACK” on the NYSE, has performed 
well relative to the broader markets since the ETF’s inception.94
Cybersecurity insurance, while new and rare in its current 
form (it originated in the late-1990s in a different form because of 
different technological capabilities),95 is expensive, potentially 
because of the difficult nature of quantifying risks96 associated 
with cybercrime and cyber terror and because few large insurers 
offer the product.97 AIG predicts that the cyber-insurance market 
even with traditional U.S. allies.  
88 See Palo Alto Networks, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) passim (Sept. 18, 2014). 
89 See FireEye, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 6 (Mar. 3, 2015). FireEye, Inc. 
advised on the famed 2013 Sony Breach. Basak, supra note 12, at 5. 
90 See Rapid7, Inc., Amendment No. 1 to Form S-1 (Form S-1/A) 52 (June 26, 2015). 
91 See, e.g., Cyber Security Solutions from IBM, IBM, http://www-304.ibm.com/ 
industries/publicsector/us/en/contentemplate1/!!/xmlid=148819 [http://perma.cc/UL58-7JUT] 
(marketing IBM’s apparent “Cyber Security Solutions” and “Cyber Security Leadership”). 
But see Alex Barinka, Five Charts Show Why IBM Is Worst Dow Stock for 2nd Year,
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Dec. 30, 2014, 12:43 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2014-12-30/five-charts-show-why-ibm-is-worst-dow-performer-for-second-year 
[http://perma.cc/J4RU-ZGQE]; Kevin Kingsbury, IBM Is One Week away from Infamy,
WALL ST. J.: MONEYBEAT (Dec. 24, 2014, 9:05 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/ 
2014/12/24/ibm-is-one-week-away-from-dow-infamy/ [http://perma.cc/G3T6-9HN8] (“IBM 
is just a week away from some infamy—becoming the first Dow component to be bottom of 
the barrel in consecutive years since now-departed Bethlehem Steel in 1995 and 1996.”); 
Heard on the Street: IBM Biggest Dow Loser for Second Year, POST-BULLETIN (Dec. 31, 
2014 4:38 PM), http://www.postbulletin.com/business/heard-on-the-street-ibm-biggest-
dow-loser-for-second/article_834834c4-fe05-588e-bf1f-ee577be4c90f.html [http://perma.cc/ 
SMM9-2F6J] (indicating collectively that IBM has been the worst performing Dow Jones 
Industrial Average component company for two years in a row in 2013 and 2014, a feat 
not accomplished since the mid-1990s, and IBM’s white papers on information technology 
on IBM’s website are typically from the decade ending 2010, with only one white paper in 
the past three years).
92 See, e.g., Cybersecurity, CISCO, http://www.cisco.com/web/strategy/government/ 
defense_cybersecurity.html [http://perma.cc/4PUG-RXDM] (indicating various industry-
specific cybersecurity solutions).
93 Basak, supra note 12, at 2.
94 PureFunds ISE Cyber Security ETF, Supplement to the Prospectus dated Nov. 7, 
2014 and Statement of Additional Information (“SAI”) dated November 7, 2014, as 
supplemented March 24, 2015 (Form 497) (June 18, 2015).
95 Basak, supra note 12, at 3. 
96 Id. (“Most firms are reluctant to offer policies for property damage resulting from 
hacking because there’s almost no data available to determine costs . . . . Insurers have 
been excluding infrastructure damage caused by cyber-attacks from standard property 
and general liability policies, said Kevin Kalinich, who leads the cyber-risk team at 
insurance broker Aon Plc.”). 
97 Id. (indicating that, for example, Zurich Insurance Group, AG and Munich Re are 
considering offering these products but do not offer the product currently). 
37838-chp_19-2 Sheet No. 25 Side B      05/09/2016   12:16:02
37838-chp_19-2 Sheet No. 25 Side B      05/09/2016   12:16:02
C M
Y K
Do Not Delete 5/3/2016 3:50 PM 
390 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 19:2
as of 2015 is $2 billion in annual premiums but could be $10 
billion in annual premiums by 2020.98
Currently, coverage limits through AIG are at $100 million 
each for both property damage and bodily injury caused by a 
cyberattack.99 Even if an established business were to pay the 
premiums for a cyber-insurance policy, these policies do not cover 
certain important cybersecurity matters, because of a lack of data 
on risk and cost.100 To contextualize this lack of actuarial data, 
insurers currently have fewer than twenty years of data points 
from which to develop cyber-insurance policies, in comparison to 
up to one hundred years of data points from which to develop and 
tweak more typical property or liability insurance.101
B. The Financial Elephant in the Room: The Entrepreneurial Cost 
Unlike established businesses, entrepreneurial startups are 
constantly concerned with so-called “runway” (the amount of 
time the company has before running out of cash),102 burn rates 
(how quickly the company spends its cash),103 and attracting new 
financial capital to allow the business to continue operating (one 
can think of this scenario as new equity investment equaling 
revenue for the entrepreneurial startup, often employing only a 
few people, typically at below-market cash consideration in 
return for equity stakes in the startup that have unlimited 
upside at the point of a successful exit, such as an acquisition or 
an IPO). And in 2014, small businesses were the target of 34% of 
spear-phishing attacks, only seven percentage points below those 
of large businesses,104 an increase of more than 88% from 2011 
levels.105 Furthermore, according to the website of 2016 presidential 
candidate, former Florida Governor Jeb Bush, in 2014 “60% of all 
targeted attacks struck small and medium-sized organizations, 
which often have fewer resources to invest in cybersecurity.”106
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id.; see also Cyber Risk Assessments, KROLL, http://www.kroll.com/en-us/cyber-
security/data-breach-prevention/cyber-risk-assessments [http://perma.cc/T76A-6NEH] 
(describing assessing risk from well-known security-in-many-industries-firm, Kroll). 
101 Basak, supra note 12, at 4. 
102 See, e.g., DAVID FEINLEIB, WHY STARTUPS FAIL: AND HOW YOURS CAN SUCCEED 33
(2012). 
103 See, e.g., EMERGING COMPANIES GUIDE, A RESOURCE FOR PROFESSIONALS AND 
ENTREPRENEURS 202–04 (Robert L. Brown & Alan S. Gutterman eds., 2d ed. 2004). 
104 SYMANTEC, supra note 51, at 14. 
105 Id. at 70 (indicating spear phishing of small businesses represented 18% of attacks 
in 2011 but 34% by 2014). 
106 Strengthening Cybersecurity, JEB!2016 (Sept. 14, 2015), https://jeb2016.com/ 
strengthening-cybersecurity/?lang=en [http://perma.cc/BF7G-G3FZ] (emphasis added). 
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This Article does not intend to convey that startups lack 
access to the choices available to established business discussed 
in Section II.A. Rather, startups often are unable to devote the 
financial resources necessary to these products because of 
runway, burn-rate, the pacing and amounts of attracting 
additional financial capital available to the enterprise, and the 
unknown costs associated with cybersecurity risk management.107
The cost of complying with existing and proposed laws, 
regulations, and orders discussed in Part III is simply impossible 
for many entrepreneurial startups, whether due to the founders’ 
ignorance of the governing rules or the inability to afford 
cyberthreat risk compliance, either financially or in terms of 
focus on growing the business.  
As a result, a question exists for the reader throughout Part 
III, which is, “should entrepreneurial startups be faced with 
complying with the same regime as established corporations as 
described in Section II.A?” 
III. FEDERAL LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND PROPOSED LEGISLATION
In early 2015, President Obama stated: “[I]n this dizzying age 
of technology and innovation . . . cyber-criminals . . . can . . . [t]urn 
your life upside down. It may take you months to get your 
finances back in order. . . . So this is a direct threat to the 
economic security of American families and we’ve got to stop 
it.”108 Elsewhere, President Obama indicated: “Our critical 
infrastructure continues to be at risk from threats in cyberspace, 
and our economy is harmed by the theft of our intellectual 
property.”109 Understanding some of what the government has 
proposed and already put in place is also necessary to 
107 See VERIZON, supra note 9, at 27–28 (“When budgeting and operating an InfoSec 
[information security] program, accurately assessing . . . how much it’ll cost [is] critically 
important. A lack of reliable estimates leads to a creative environment for decision 
making, where underspending, overspending, and useless spending invariably result.”). 
Verizon estimated that the average financial loss from a cyber breach per 1000 records 
was between $52,000 and $87,000. Given that many angel investors typically provide 
startup capital to entrepreneurs in chunks of approximately $25,000–$50,000, seed-stage 
investment can be eliminated by a cyber breach, without even discussing the cost of cyber 
risk management. Even the predicted cost of only 100 records is over $25,000. Id.
108 Remarks by the President at the Federal Trade Commission, WHITE HOUSE
(Jan. 12, 2015, 12:15 PM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/12/remarks- 
president-federal-trade-commission [http://perma.cc/GZT6-RZHQ]; see also Tau & Dwoskin, 
supra note 53 (“The proposals came amid the revelation the U.S. Central Command 
Twitter and YouTube accounts appeared to have been [hacked by Islamic militants], 
underscoring cybersecurity challenges the U.S. faces. The tweets posted by the hackers 
purportedly included phone numbers of top military commanders and claimed to provide 
military scenarios for a [potential] conflict with North Korea and China.”). 
109 Foreign Policy Cyber Security, WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
issues/foreign-policy/cybersecurity [http://perma.cc/9JM4-NQ2M]. 
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appreciating the entrepreneurial startup’s perspective in terms of 
cybersecurity and cyberterrorism protection efforts. This Part 
describes several of those measures, including proposed and 
existing legislation and recent comments from regulatory 
agencies. 
A.  Proposed Legislation
Timed to coincide with the comments quoted in this Part’s 
opening paragraph, at a speech delivered at the Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”), the Obama administration indicated that it 
would be introducing legislation of varying sorts with the hope of 
protecting consumers from cyberattacks.110 These proposals 
generally aimed at protecting privacy, preventing identity theft, 
and helping children remain safe in cyberspace. The following 
day, the President announced additional proposals at DHS.111
There, President Obama discussed how the federal 
government could “work with the private sector to better protect 
American companies against cyber threats.”112 The President 
further indicated: “Foreign governments, criminals and hackers 
probe America’s computer networks every single day. We saw 
that again with the attack at Sony, which actually destroyed data 
and computer hardware that is going to be very costly for that 
company to clean up.”113
These proposals were added to the President’s 2013 
Executive Order 13636, which—issued exactly two years to the 
week before the 2015 proposals—concerned cyberthreats, 
including cyberterrorist threats, to the nation’s infrastructure.114
Yet, as of October 2015, the cybersecurity web page at 
whitehouse.gov had no updates—text or video—since May 1, 2015, 
well before the numerous cyberattacks described earlier in this 
Article.115
B. SEC and FINRA 
From a business perspective, perhaps the next most relevant 
guidance comes from the Securities and Exchange Commission 
110 Remarks by the President at the Federal Trade Commission, supra note 108. 
111 Remarks by the President at the National Cybersecurity Communications 
Integration Center, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 13, 2015, 3:10 PM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
the-press-office/2015/01/13/remarks-president-national-cybersecurity-communications-
integration-cent [http://perma.cc/XP7B-326J]. 
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Executive Order -- Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, WHITE HOUSE
(Jan. 12, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/executive-order-
improving-critical-infrastructure-cybersecurity [http://perma.cc/U2YE-RD6B]. 
115 Foreign Policy Cyber Security, supra note 109. 
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(“SEC”) and Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”). 
In 2014, the SEC’s Office of Compliance Inspections and 
Examinations (“OCIE”) examined approximately fifty broker-dealers 
(“B/Ds”) and fifty registered investment advisers (“RIAs”).116 OCIE’s 
ultimate report indicated that a majority of B/Ds and RIAs 
examined maintained written information security policies 
(“WISPs”), nearly half of those firms examined identified industry 
cybersecurity practices via peer groups or information sharing, 
and more than 90% of B/Ds and RIAs employed some sort of 
encryption. These data points resulted from participating firms 
answering questionnaires, not from any inspection or testing by 
OCIE or a designated third-party to act on OCIE’s behalf.117
FINRA’s report described what the organization not only 
viewed as the material cybersecurity risks facing B/Ds but also 
believed were appropriate risk mitigation tactics, including 
references to the NIST framework.118 The report identified risk 
assessment and oversight of third-party vendors (“vendor 
management”), consultants, and others, as a material concern for 
B/Ds.119 Currently, however, neither B/Ds nor RIAs are under 
any SEC requirement to maintain cyberthreat insurance or have 
written policies regarding customer losses in the event of a cyber 
breach. 
C. The SAFETY Act 
The so-called “Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering Effective 
Technologies Act of 2002” (“SAFETY Act”)120 provides, in essence, 
a shield for certain businesses from tort liability. Specifically, the 
SAFETY Act provides a safe harbor—in the form of an 
indemnity—to cybersecurity businesses that fail in their 
essential function of providing cybersecurity.121 While this Article 
focuses on the indemnity provision, as authors Finch and Spiegel 
116 Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, U.S. Securities & Exchange 
Commission, Cybersecurity Examination Sweep Summary, 4 NAT’L EXAM PROGRAM RISK
ALERT (Feb. 3, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/cybersecurity-examination-
sweep-summary.pdf [http://perma.cc/BKM8-BF6Q]. 
117 Anthony Zeoli, Lock It up: SEC & FINRA Weigh in on Cybersecurity Issues (Feb. 
23, 2015, 10:09 PM), http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2015/02/63237-lock-it-up-sec-finra-
weigh-in-on-cybersecurity-issues/ [http://perma.cc/A4MT-UKJE]. 
118 FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., REPORT ON CYBERSECURITY PRACTICES 42–43 
(2015). For more on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), see 
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, www.nist.gov [http://perma.cc/ 
E8HW-YKXR].
119 FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., supra note 118. 
120 Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. 
§§ 441–444 (2012) [hereinafter SAFETY Act].
121 After Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), if 
corporations are persons, then the word that attaches to describe corporations is “who,” 
not “that.” 
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asserted: “These liability protections can take the form of 
jurisdictional defenses, a cap on liability, or a presumption of 
immediate dismissal of third-party liability claims.”122
In addition, the SAFETY Act permits the federal government 
to give a seal of approval to certain entities (very similar to the 
FTC’s COPPA compliance seal, despite negotiable prices and 
hacks that occurred and despite Target having been COPPA 
compliant). These entities receive a certification as a “Qualified 
Anti-Terrorism Technology” or “QATT.”123 The SAFETY Act 
mandates that all cyberterrorism-related liability claims must be 
litigated in federal court; punitive damages and pre-judgment 
interest awards are barred; and compensatory damages are 
capped at an amount agreed to by both the government and 
company, with the damage cap equal to a set amount of 
insurance the company must possess. Further, damages awarded 
to plaintiffs will be offset by any collateral recoveries they receive 
(e.g., victim compensation funds, life insurance, etc.).124
As Finch and Spiegel asserted: “The only way this 
presumption of immunity can be overcome is to demonstrate that 
the application contained information that was submitted 
through fraud or willful misconduct.”125 Cyberattacks are 
governed by the SAFETY Act’s definition of “terrorism,” 
regardless of the type of product or service in which the business 
is engaged (i.e., the business does not have to be in the 
technology space for these protections to apply). However, any 
client who purchases QATT-approved software from a certified 
QATT seller is absolved from any liability, so long as an act of 
terrorism is declared by the Secretary of Homeland Security.126
Simply put, the seller of the QATT is the sole look-to for 
liability, and the DHS painstakingly articulated this fact when 
122 Brian E. Finch & Leslie H. Spiegel, Litigation Following a Cyber Attack: Possible 
Outcomes and Mitigation Strategies Utilizing the Safety Act, 30 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH.
L.J. 349, 351 (2014). 
123 SAFETY Act, 6 U.S.C. §§ 441–444 (detailing QATT). 
124 Id. § 442. 
125 Finch & Spiegel, supra note 122, at 369 (referencing the regulations implementing 
the SAFETY Act of 2002, 71 Fed. Reg. 33147, 33150 (June 8, 2006) (codified in 6 C.F.R. 
pt. 25)); see also 6 U.S.C. § 444(2)(b). 
126 The SAFETY Act states:
There shall exist a Federal cause of action for claims arising out of, relating 
to, or resulting from an act of terrorism when qualified anti-terrorism 
technologies have been deployed in defense against or response or recovery 
from such act and such claims result or may result in loss to the 
Seller. . . . Such Federal cause of action shall be brought only for claims for 
injuries that are proximately caused by sellers that provide qualified 
anti-terrorism technology to Federal and non-Federal government customers.
6 U.S.C. § 442(a)(1) (2012). 
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promulgating the final rule implementing the SAFETY Act.127
Practically, the SAFETY Act supersedes the existing bankruptcy 
system and replaces an entire body of law with an explicit 
government grant to internalize arguably nominal costs for large 
businesses who can afford to purchase QATT-approved software, 
raising the question of whether entrepreneurial startups are able 
to purchase QATT-approved software, and externalizing the 
tremendous damage that could occur should a cyber-terror attack 
happen to a given safe-harbored business. 
D. Discussion of Policy Prescriptions Generally 
Typically, a law journal article identifies a problem and then 
attempts to propose a unique solution underpinned by a proposed 
law, rule, regulation, executive order or the like. However, as Scott 
Kannry, the CEO of Aon Global in the insurance industry—the 
holder of both a J.D. and M.B.A.—has stated: 
[Saying that the cybersecurity industry is] [f]ailing isn’t the right 
description, although one could easily come to that conclusion given 
the trend line on events over the past 12 months. I would characterize 
the industry as one that needs a better approach. To date, most of the 
focus has been on solutions –firewalls, encryption, antivirus, you 
name it. The problem is that a cyber security program consists of 
dozens, if not hundreds of technologies, policies and procedures, none 
of which is a silver bullet and any of which can be immediately 
outdated based on the ever evolving risk climate. Imagine if your job 
was solely focused on putting together a puzzle, but some pieces were 
missing, others didn’t fit together, and every 30 minutes the board 
changed. Technically, you would fail, but you never really stood a 
chance!128
As a result, current cybersecurity policies appear too lax; the 
question is how the public and private sector should procedurally 
and substantively build an effective framework.  
127 Regulations Implementing the Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering Effective 
Technologies (SAFETY) Act of 2002, 71 Fed. Reg. at 33150–51 (“Congress balanced the 
need to provide recovery to plaintiffs against the need to ensure adequate deployment 
of anti-terrorism technologies by creating a cause of action that provides a certain 
level of recovery against Sellers, while at the same time protecting others in the 
supply chain.”); see also 6 C.F.R. § 25.7(d) (2016) (“There shall exist only one cause of 
action for loss of property, personal injury, or death for performance or 
non-performance of the Seller’s Qualified Anti-Terrorism Technology in relation to an
Act of Terrorism. Such cause of action may be brought only against the Seller of the 
Qualified Anti-Terrorism Technology and may not be brought against the buyers, the 
buyers’ contractors, or downstream users of the Technology, the Seller’s suppliers or
contractors, or any other person or entity.”). 
128 Christopher P. Skroupa, The Insurance Industry’s Unique Vantage Point on Cyber 
Security, FORBES (July 9, 2015, 5:42 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherskroupa/
2015/07/09/the-insurance-industrys-unique-vantage-point-on-cyber-security/.
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IV. EVIDENCE THAT A PUBLIC-PRIVATE OR PRIVATE MARKET
ALTERNATIVE EXISTS
In his January 2015 remarks to DHS, President Obama 
indicated that “[n]either government, nor the private sector can 
defend the nation alone. It’s going to have to be a shared 
mission—government and industry working hand-in-hand as 
partners.”129 This Part explores that option, with an eye toward 
the entrepreneurial startup.  
Yet, as this Article indicated above, many of the available 
cyber-protection solutions—whether software or insurance, 
regardless of not only the size of the enterprise offering the cyber 
protection but also the QATT-approval safe harbor 
involvement—are simply too expensive for entrepreneurial startups 
concerned with burn rate, runway, and continuing capital raises 
while protecting against founder and insider equity dilution. 
For example, the sole government resource that appears to 
exist for small businesses, of which entrepreneurial startups are 
a flavor, is the Federal Communication Commission’s (“FCC’s”) 
“Small Biz Cyber Planner 2.0.”130 And version 2.0 was launched 
three years ago in October 2012, which, going back to Moore’s 
Law,131 likely means that the Cyber Planner is out of date, 
despite the FCC’s stated goal of providing “an online resource to 
help small businesses create customized cybersecurity plans.”132
“As larger companies take steps to secure their systems, less 
secure small businesses are easier targets for cyber criminals.”133
The planner itself is a fifty-one page booklet (also 
customizable for a business on the FCC’s website, but all 
information comes directly from the booklet) that includes 
sections such as (1) inventory your data; (2) keep a record of the 
data’s location, and move the record to more appropriate places 
when needed; (3) develop a privacy policy; (4) protect data 
collected on the Internet (stating “you need to make sure any 
data collected through your website and stored by the third party 
is sufficiently secure,” as if that level of due diligence is 
necessarily feasible); (5) create layers of security; (6) plan for 
data loss or theft (threateningly stating “[n]ot only can the loss or 
theft of data hurt your business, brand and customer confidence, 
129 Air Force Tech. Sgt. Jake Richmond, Obama Unveils Next Steps in Cybersecurity 
Plan, U.S. DEP’T DEF. (Jan. 13, 2015), http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article 
/603919 [http://perma.cc/SXL2-9DR6]. 
130 Cyberplanner, FED. COMM. COMMISSION, https://www.fcc.gov/cyberplanner 
[http://perma.cc/GRD5-7BYL]. 
131 See Harsha, supra note 2. 
132 Cyberplanner, supra note 130. 
133 Id.
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it can also expose you to the often-costly state and federal 
regulations that cover data protection and privacy. Data loss can 
also expose businesses to significant litigation risk”).134 Whether 
entrepreneurs even have the time to read this material is 
questionable, given that founders must essentially dedicate all of 
their waking hours to their fledgling businesses. The FCC also 
provides arguably meaningful guidance to protect mobile wallets, 
which employ software downloaded to a mobile device to pay for 
commercial transactions or person-to-person payments.135 The 
advice provided in this booklet is of questionable value in 
functioning as a cyber safeguard. 
As a result, entrepreneurial startups face unique challenges 
when faced with defending their firms from hackers, 
cybercriminals, cyberterrorists, and others attempting to 
successfully breach data, big data, or systems, via the Internet or 
the Internet of Things, negatively affecting the startups, 
including to the point of the startups’ very existences. Part V 
advances some initial proposals for further discussion and 
evaluation that would assist the entrepreneurial startup when 
dealing with the very real threats that face entrepreneurs. 
V. PROPOSED INITIAL DISCUSSION POINTS FOR ENTREPRENEURIAL
SUCCESS FACING CYBERTHREATS
This Part asserts several proposals that may be both cost 
efficient and effective for the startup and effective for the 
startup’s consumer base. First, communication and cooperation 
between the public and private sector are important.136 Having 
said that, much of corporate law—beyond securities regulation, 
taxation, consumer protection, and immigrant worker visas—
concerning entrepreneurial startups resides at the state level. 
From entity formation to the applicable internal affairs doctrine 
affecting the startup, to terms of use for many apps and web 
platforms, the end-user must agree to specific state law for 
applicable law, jurisdiction, and forum. Because of state law’s 
importance, the proposals in this Part reflect suggestions for 
state-level changes to corporate codes, rather than action on the 
part of federal agencies. 
134 Cyber Security Planning Guide, FED. COMM. COMMISSION PDS-1–PDS-5, 
https://transition.fcc.gov/cyber/cyberplanner.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZW8V-4PAQ]; see also
FCC Smartphone Security Checker, FED. COMM. COMMISSION, https://www.fcc.gov/smart 
phone-security [http://perma.cc/T8CW-Y6AQ] (last updated Oct. 30, 2015, 12:45 PM). 
135 Mobile Wallet Services Protection, FED. COMM. COMMISSION, https://www.fcc.gov/ 
guides/mobile-wallet-services-protection [http://perma.cc/T7F6-FCY5] (last updated Nov. 
4, 2015, 12:00 AM). 
136 See Basak, supra note 12. 
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A.  Corporate Governance 
Ultimately, corporations are governed by a board of directors.137
Corporate boards have fiduciary duties of care (unless 
exculpated) and loyalty to the company and shareholders.138 One 
proposal is that a part of the duty of care that cannot be 
exculpated is that each corporation must create a functioning 
risk management committee, under whose umbrella falls 
cybersecurity. For public companies, the SEC could take the 
position that, similar to the Sarbanes-Oxley-mandated 
requirement of an audit committee expert serving on the audit 
committee, an IT or risk management expert serve on that 
committee. I would prefer to see such requirements come from 
the state-level so that businesses can choose what governance 
framework works best for them among a variety of cybersecurity 
fiduciary risk management options. For entrepreneurial startups 
advised appropriately, the fear of personal liability for breaching 
the fiduciary of care should be sufficient incentive to create a 
risk-management committee, without the added need and cost of 
an IT expert serving on the committee. People tend to respond to 
incentives, and the incentive of facing unlimited personal 
liability for a fiduciary duty breach should encourage many 
entrepreneurial startups to create a risk-management committee. 
B.  Sliding Scales for Size 
To avoid disincentivizing entrepreneurial startups from 
forming while balancing the need to operate in a riskless 
manner, a sliding scale for liability could exist. This Article 
stipulates that little to no logical reason exists for many arbitrary 
numbers that laws and regulations use relative to requirements 
and exemptions for corporations, based on either financial or 
employee pool size. Having said that, this Article does advance 
that appropriately tailored safe harbors from liability should 
exist for businesses with an equity capitalization under an 
inflation-adjusted amount of, hypothetically, $100 million, those 
entities with fewer than, somewhere near twenty employees, and 
newly formed entities fewer than approximately thirteen months 
in age that are non-affiliates of previously existing enterprises. 
With the rapid pace that entrepreneurial startups must 
deploy capital for research and development, alpha testing, beta 
testing, a focus on obtaining additional capital from angel or 
137 A discussion of LLCs or the array of other owner-liability-shielded entities is 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
138 See generally D. GORDON SMITH & CYNTHIA A. WILLIAMS, BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS (2d ed. 2004). 
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venture capital investors (or both), seed stage companies often 
lack the time and human and financial capital to employ 
attorneys to advise them of the need for cyber-risk assessments. 
This Article does not believe that it is effective policy to kill off 
fledgling businesses that are cyberhacked, because those 
companies simply lacked the knowledge, the resources, or the 
time because of their nascent nature. As the businesses grow in 
size, time of existence, and financial capital, then sliding scales of 
obligations should begin to fall on the entrepreneurial ventures.  
These matters could be self-regulating, for example, by the 
Venture Capital Association of America or other similar groups 
affecting the startup ecosystem. What fund manager would want 
to deploy venture or seed-stage capital to an enterprise that was 
naked in the face of cyber risk? Couple this self-regulation with 
tweaking of existing state statutes on fiduciary duties that would 
require an organization to face risk management of cybersecurity 
in its evaluation of fiduciary duty exculpation at entity 
formation, and the private sector can self-regulate for 
entrepreneurs.  
C. Private-Public Partnering of Cyber Insurance for Startups 
Protecting startups should not, however, come at the 
expense of consumers. As a result, affordable and meaningful 
cyber insurance could be required by states. A need for this 
insurance exists, as articulated earlier in this Article, but costs 
are high and insurers lack the actuarial data that they need. 
State-level, or if absolutely necessary, federal level, cyber-terror 
or cyberthreat insurance could be mandated and overseen by a 
government insurance agency, such as the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) or Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation (“PBGC”). While, for example, the PBGC has 
protected the pensions of millions of Americans since the entities 
formation under ERISA in the mid-1970s, PBGC is funded by the 
companies whose pension plans it insures, rather than the 
taxpaying public, and claimants are paid based on a sliding scale 
based on financial capital. A similar framework may work well in 
the case of protecting customers of startup enterprises from 
financial loss, and the insurance and administration of the 
insurance may be at a lower cost than currently exists in the 
marketplace.  
CONCLUSION
In mid-October 2015 at the first Democratic Party 
presidential debate, moderator Anderson Cooper asked: “[w]hat 
is the greatest national security threat to the United States?”  
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Out of five candidates—among whom were four senators, two 
governors, a former secretary of state, and a former secretary of 
the Navy—only one candidate, attorney, former Navy secretary, 
and Senator Jim Webb, responded with “cyberthreats.” Webb 
indicated: “Our greatest day-to-day threat is cyber warfare 
against this country.”139
Regardless of whether former Senator Webb is correct in his 
assessment of the single greatest security threat to the United 
States, cyber terror and cybersecurity are legitimate emerging 
threats to this nation. And in the face of those threats, this 
Article has proposed problems and policy solutions specific to 
protecting this country’s citizenry from cyberattacks on 
businesses, with an emphasis on the specific challenges faced by 
entrepreneurial startups in that effort that are far different than 
the challenges faced by established businesses in the hopes of 
spurring a dialogue at this Symposium that both protects the 
U.S. populace and remains supportive of ensuring an 
environment supportive of entrepreneurial startups from 
ideation to commercialization. 
139 CNN Democratic Debate – Full Transcript, CNN (Oct. 13, 2015, 11:26 PM), 
http://cnnpressroom.blogs.cnn.com/2015/10/13/cnn-democratic-debate-full-transcript/ [http:// 
perma.cc/66UV-EN6J].
